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Balancing, the Global and the Local:
Judicial Balancing as a Problematic
Topic in Comparative (Constitutional)
Law
By JACCO BOMHOFF
Continental legal theory is uncannily "other" for an American,
perhaps because just about everything in our legal culture is present
in theirs, often translated word for word, but nothing seems to have
the same meaning.
- Duncan Kennedy
A Critique of Adjudication (fin de si&cle), 1997
I. Introduction
Courts in much of the Western world often use very similar-
sounding, 'balancing' language when adjudicating constitutional or
fundamental rights claims. In freedom of expression cases, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court has used a variety of balancing
tests;2 the German Constitutional Court insists courts "must weigh the
* Leiden University, the Netherlands. M.Jur. Oxford, 2003. Parts of an earlier
version of this article were presented at a panel on "Questioning Globalization"
organized by Professor Joel Paul at the 2007 Law & Society Conference in Berlin.
Thanks to participants for their comments. Research for this article was carried out
within the framework of an ongoing project entitled "Judicial reasoning in
fundamental rights cases - national and European perspectives,"convened by
Professor Janneke Gerards (Leiden University). Thanks to her and to Martijn
Polak, Maurice Adams, Anne Meuwese, Felix Ronkes Agerbeek and Caspar van
Woensel for their suggestions. All remaining errors are my own.
1. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SItCLE) 92
(1997).
2. Cf Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961).
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values to be protected against each other;"3 the European Court of
Human Rights makes standard references to the need to 'balance'
individual rights and public interests;4 and the Supreme Court of
Canada has held that in each case, "courts will be required to balance
the interests of society with those of individuals and groups."5
It has become increasingly common for commentators to identify
these individual, or systematic, references to balancing with a
transition from 'balancing' as a feature within fundamental rights
adjudication to 'balancing' as an emblematic characteristic of entire
legal systems and cultures. The German Professor Walter Leisner,
for example, has written about the German legal system: "It is clear
that more has to be seen in... balancing than mere isolated searches
for justice in individual cases: Behind these notions stands a
foundational conception of the State (Staatsgrundkonzeption).' 6 For
the political scientist Alec Stone Sweet, 'proportionality balancing'
has emerged as a "master technique of judicial governance in the
EU.",7 And in the United States, the constitutional scholar Alexander
Aleinikoff famously identified an "age of balancing" for American
constitutional law in the late 1980s.8
Aggregates of balancing references are, finally, also given
meanings across jurisdictions. In Duncan Kennedy's view, for
example, the idea of "balancing of conflicting considerations" is a
defining characteristic of a "globalization of law and legal thought"
that has taken place since World War II.9  For the Canadian
3. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], Jan.
15, 1958, 7 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 198 (F.R.G.).
4. Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at para. 6 (1979).
5. R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103 (Can.), para. 70 (emphasis added). The
Oakes-test is applicable to all areas of rights adjudication under the Canadian
Charter. For more references, see, e.g., AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A
DEMOCRACY (2006); Paul W. Kahn, Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2677, 2698 (2003) ("Judicial review in the Israeli Supreme Court is
an endless deployment of proportionality review"); more sources are cited in David
S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2005). Discussion in this
article will be limited to examples taken from North America and Europe.
6. WALTER LEISNER, DER ABWAGUNGSSTAAT 20, 174 (1997) (author
translated).
7. ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 243-244
(2004)(emphasis added).
8. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
9. Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought, 36
(Vol. 31:2
Balancing, the Global and the Local
constitutional law scholar Lorraine Weinrib, judicial balancing is an
element of what she calls "the Postwar Paradigm" of constitutional
rights adjudication; a model for constitutional review that has had
"extensive reach and deep transformative power."1°  Another
Canadian scholar, finally, has recently argued that judicial balancing
is an integral element of a principle of proportionality as a universal
"ultimate rule of law.""
On the basis of this torrent of similar-sounding language from
such a wide variety of jurisdictions and sources, it might be thought
that judges and constitutional lawyers have hit upon a highly coveted
prize of comparative law scholarship: a community of discourse.12
Comparative lawyers have long had the ambition "to develop some
neutral framework, some common language with which several legal
systems could be described in a way accessible to... lawyers
belonging to any one of those legal systems."' 3 The "language of
judicial balancing," it seems, is taken by many to form at least a
building block of such a common discourse.
Coveted goals, however, are often elusive. And the danger that
faces any semblance of a "community of discourse," is that such a
community, as Mirjan Damagka has put it, might be "mainly a
rhetorical achievement," people using similar expressions without
actually meaning similar things. 4 Suspicion that something like this
could be the case for "balancing" is raised when we take a more
detailed look at balancing references in the judicial opinions and legal
literature of different legal systems and cultures, as, upon closer
inspection, these references do in fact show marked differences. In
Europe and Canada, for example, balancing is hardly ever mentioned
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631 (2003). See also Thomas Grey, Judicial Review and Legal
Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST LAW. L. REV. 473 (2003) (on the spread of judicial
review and balancing in the U.S. and in Europe) and MORTON HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992) (on the rise of "balancing tests" as the main characteristic of the
transition from 19th century to 20th century legal thought).
10. Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism,
in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).
11. Cf DAVID BEATrY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004).
12. Cf MIRJAN R. DAMA9KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 67
(1986).
13. Cf Mark van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms
and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q.. 495,530 (1998).
14. DAMA KA, supra note 12, at 67-68.
2008]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
without simultaneous reference to a "principle of proportionality," a
term rarely used in U.S. legal discourse.15 Conversely, American
judges and authors often refer to balancing 'tests' while such
designations are unfamiliar in Europe. 16  There are also clear
differences in the kinds of parameters courts in different systems say
they are weighing, with German courts much more prone to engage in
a weighing of "values" than U.S. courts.7 Broader discussions, too,
show differences. European debates on balancing, for example, often
omit extended treatment of institutional considerations or of a
relationship between the use of balancing and particular substantive
outcomes; both elements are central to discussions in the United
States.18 In contrast, one of the most important debates on balancing
in Europe turns, to a large extent, on the "formal rationality" - in the
Weberian sense - of balancing as legal argument. 9 Discussions of this
dimension, in turn, seem to be lacking from the voluminous American
literature on balancing.'
The object of this article is to provide a framework for
understanding relevant similarities and differences in this broad range
of references to 'balancing' in contemporary constitutional legal
discourse. The article argues that understanding and evaluating
"balancing"-related language in judicial opinions and literature, as
15. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About Proportionality, 21
CONST. COMMENT 803 (2004) (review of BEATTY, supra note 11).
16. See generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE
MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989).
17. Frequently used parameters are "interests," "principles," "rights,"
"circumstances" and "considerations."
18. Fear of "balancing away" rights protection is a pervasive theme in American
literature on constitutional judicial review. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal
Judging.: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293
(1992). For more on this aspect of European/US difference, see Duncan Kennedy &
Marie-Claire Belleau, La place de Ren6 Demogue dans la gdnealogie de la pens6e
juridique contemporaine, 56 REVUE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE D'ETUDES JURIDIQUE 163,
180 (2006) (noting the absence of "arguments de compdtences institutionelles" in
French thinking on balancing and pointing to their centrality in American legal
thought).
19. This is the Habermas/Alexy debate. See Robert A. Alexy, Constitutional
Rights, Balancing, and Rationality, 16 RATIO JURIS 131 (2003); Robert A. Alexy, On
Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison, 16 RATIO JURIS 433; JURGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND Noms (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992). For
an overview of the debate, see Steven Greer, 'Balancing' and the European Court of
Human Rights. A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
412 (2004).
20. See discussion infra Section 111.3.
[Vol. 31:2
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well as appraising broader qualifications of legal systems, cultures and
trends in terms of "balancing," present a number of especially
difficult challenges for comparative law methodology. Two kinds of
such challenges will be distinguished.
First, in terms of traditional divisions in comparative law
methodology, "balancing" straddles the divide between the two
dominant sets of approaches in a uniquely complicated way,
exhibiting intimate connections to the premises and methods of both
functionalism and of functionalism's critiques. On the one hand,
judicial references to balancing are at heart arguments, offered to
legitimize the exercise of political authority in particular settings. As
with any other type of reasoning, the legitimizing force of these
arguments is inherently dependent on local meanings and
understandings.2' At the same time however, balancing references
are special forms of argument in the sense that they exhibit a number
of unique ties to ideas and understandings that transcend the local,
legal landscape. In many of its manifestations, balancing, as
argument, draws continuous explicit and implicit connections to
notions of fairness and rationality that are presented as having a
strong universal dimension.2 Complicating matters still further is the
fact that the precise nature of these relationships to this dimension of
universality can be shown, again, to differ among legal systems and
cultures. The article argues that because of this local/universal
duality, and perhaps more than any other element in contemporary
legal culture, balancing is intimately attached to the foundational
concerns and premises of the two competing basic models for
comparative analysis: functionalist approaches andtheir criticisms.
There is a second dimension to the complexity of balancing as a
topic in comparative law. This lies in the fact that the ideas and
practices that underlie and shape judicial balancing habitually
transcend many of the basic conceptual oppositions that are
21. Cf CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS- TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC
138 (J. Wilkinson & P. Weaver trans., 1969) (1958) ("it is in relation to an audience
that all argumentation is developed").
22. One way to illustrate this is by reference to John Rawls' influential
understanding of legitimacy, which draws specifically upon "reasonableness" and
"rationality." See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (1996) ("[O]ur exercise
of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as
reasonable and rational").
2008]
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characteristic for legal thought generally. Familiar distinctions
between, for example, "form and substance," "process and outcome,"
or "law and politics" collapse when faced with the task of classifying
balancing, as references may fit both, or any one, of these categories.
Since these conceptual categories are generally the same ones that
comparative analysis employs as common terms of reference, the
dualities exhibited by many balancing references cause particular
problems for comparative study.
These two sets of difficulties in situating balancing in terms of
traditional comparative law approaches - complex ambivalence
between the universal and the particular, and ambiguity in terms of
legal categories - are intimately related to the very foundations of the
ideas and practices that make up judicial balancing in contemporary
constitutional adjudication. Analyzing the relationship between
balancing and comparative law methodology in detail, therefore, may
ultimately contribute to our understanding of balancing itself.
The article is structured as follows. Part II discusses the ways in
which comparative law's dominant methodologies take position with
regard to the topic of judicial balancing. Parts III and IV then take
up the two sets of problems identified above and discusses how each
of these themes impacts the relationship between balancing and
comparative legal studies. Part V concludes and sets out guidelines
for future research.
IL. Similarities and Differences: Balancing, Functionalism,
and Expressivism
A. Introduction
Understanding references to "balancing" by courts and
commentators in different legal systems means confronting one of
comparative law's most vigorously contested dilemmas: the question
of similarities and differences among legal cultures.2 Successive
waves of comparative law scholarship have debated this question to
23. See, e.g., MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004) (in
particular Chapter 5); Gerhard Danneman, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities
or Differences?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); Catherine Valcke, Comparative Law
as Comparative Jurisprudence: The Comparability of Legal Systems, 52 AM. J.
COMP. L. 713 (2004).
[Vol. 31:2
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such an extent that for some modern authors, "the division between
the proponents of similarity-oriented and those of difference-oriented
comparison" constitutes "the most visible methodological cleavage in
contemporary comparative law. ' '24 The similarities/differences debate
can, in turn, be seen as a reflection of two fundamental issues at stake
in comparative research: (a) the question of what to compare (objects
of comparison), and (b) the question of "of what and how much
context to include" (scope of comparison)." The relationship
between the dilemma and these two underlying, fundamental
questions becomes evident from looking at the key tenets of two
opposing camps in comparative methodology: that "incomparables
cannot usefully be compared 2 6 and, that findings of sameness are
"necessarily based on a repression of pertinent differences."27
This Part first illustrates the relevance of the question of
similarities and differences for the topic of balancing by listing a
number of basic ambiguities that references to balancing in legal
discourse may present. This section then gives a brief overview of the
main approaches to comparative law, structured along the dividing
line between functionalist approaches and a number of methods
united primarily in their rejection of functionalism. These
alternatives will be grouped together here under the label of
expressivist approaches.' For each set of approaches, the description
focuses on the most distinctive assumptions and interests, in full
recognition of the fact that very few actual comparative studies will
rigorously follow all of any one approach. For each of the two basic
perspectives, special attention will be paid to how they would
24. LASSER, supra note 23, at 146 (emphases added).
25. Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box. Comparative Law in the Era of
Information, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 228, 240 (1999) ("Any amount of contextual
detail that the comparativist might provide seems insufficient, and yet every amount
of detail threatens the possibility of comparing across different systems"). See also
Danneman, supra note 23, at 394 ("It appears on closer inspection that much of the
opposition between a presumption of similarity and a presumption of difference does
not relate to whether laws are generally similar or different. What is more
controversial is which aspects of law and its context are most relevant for
comparative research...").
26. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAw 34 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998) (1971).
27. Pierre Legrand, The Same and the Different, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 261 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday
eds., 2003), cited in LASSER, supra note 23, at 145.
28. Following Mark V. Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1255 (2003).
20081
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approach the study of balancing in constitutional rights adjudication.
B. Balancing References and the Object and Scope of
Comparison
As applied to the basic observation that judges in many
jurisdictions often use very similar balancing language when
adjudicating upon fundamental rights claims, the questions of
similarities and differences and of object and scope of comparison
play out in many different ways. To illustrate the relevant issues, here
are two quotations, taken from the U.S. Supreme Court and the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"), both on appropriate
limitations to freedom of expression:
Whenever, in such a context, these constitutional protections are
asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a
reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an
appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved.29
A balance must be sought between the exercise by the press of the
right guaranteed to it ... and the necessity to impose a restriction
on the exercise of this right.30
Taken by themselves, all that these short quotations establish is
that both the ECHR and the U.S. Supreme Court do, at least on some
occasions, refer to "balancing" or "weighing" when dealing with
freedom of expression claims. But beyond that, little is clear, as each
reference may code for a number of very different underlying ideas.
We cannot tell, for example, whether the references to weighing are
statements of doctrine that courts intend to apply, and have applied,
or more general, informal descriptions of issues they see before them.
We cannot tell why these courts see the need to balance: whether it is
because they feel that this is what the protection of freedom of
expression - or perhaps their task as judges in a democracy - is
fundamentally about, or whether it is because the judges cannot agree
on anything more than that some sort of accommodation between
individual and societal interests is important.3 We do not know
29. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961).
30. Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at para. 6 (1979).
31. Think of the difference between "grand" theory and "little" theory as
described by, for example, MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). Balancing could figure in - or be -
either. Balancing may also be part of pragmatism or of minimalism as approaches to
[Vol. 31:2
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whether, in presenting their reasoning in terms of balancing, judges
understand their activity as being a specific form of interpretation or
application of law in any traditional sense, or whether these
references are intended precisely to signal an acknowledgement of
the limits to traditional understandings of adjudication, and an
admission of the political quality of judging. Neither can we say
whether the relevant courts are taking a bold, controversial position
in a debate or merely stating what they and their audience believe to
be obvious.32
Questions such as these, primarily, raise the issue of the scope of
comparison; given the basic linguistic similarity between the two
courts' statements, how deep should we prod and how much context
should we include in assessing their meaning. When this linguistic
similarity - obvious in the two statements cited - becomes more
tenuous, deciding on the object of comparison becomes more
complicated as well. Here one relevant question would be whether to
include for comparison statements of the U.S. Supreme Court on the
need to "weigh the circumstances,"33 on the ground that the basic
similarity in the use of the balancing metaphor warrants comparison,
or whether we should take the difference between "circumstances,"
"rights" and "interests" to be a crucial difference that should not be
repressed. Also, when the U.S. Supreme Court finds that it should
assess whether a certain governmental regulation of speech "is not
more extensive than is necessary, '"" it is not clear what should be
more important: the fact that the court, here too, requires some sort
of explicit, case-by-case valuation and comparison of different
parameters, or the fact that words like "balancing" or "weighing" are
not used directly, even when these same courts often do actually
couple such statements with a reference to balancing?
C. Functionalist Approaches
In methodological terms, the opposition between similarities and
differences, and the questions of object and context referred to
constitutional adjudication. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and
Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473 (2003); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).
32. The Majority in Konigsberg was arguably doing the former, the Strasbourg
Court in Sunday Times the latter.
33. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
34. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (establishing a specific test for "commercial speech").
2008]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
before, find their expression in debates over the virtues and flaws of
the functional method35 Functionalist approaches take as their basic
premise the idea that "the problems of justice are basically the same
in time and space throughout the world."36 In Zweigert and Kotz's
canonical formulation, from a functionalist perspective "the legal
system of every society faces essentially the same problems, and
solves these problems by quite different means though very often
with similar results.
3 7
Functionalist approaches take a clear position with regard to the
questions of the object of comparison and the similarities/differences
controversy. The objects of comparison are the "solutions" different
legal orders and cultures have found to the uniform problems that
face them.38 In this sense, functionalist studies are interested in
outcomes rather than in the processes that lead to these outcomes;
what counts for the purpose of comparison in functionalist
approaches "is the fact of a solution and not the ideas, concepts, or
legal arguments that support the solution."39  With regard to the
differences/similarities controversy, functionalists come down
strongly on the side of similarities. For Vivian Grosswald Curran, the
dominant functionalist perspective has reflected a "conscious,
articulated intent to identify unifying elements and to discount
differentiating ones."'
35. Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method, in Reimann & Zimmermann, supra
note 23, 339 at 339-40 (arguing that the debate over the functional method "is the
focal point of almost all discussions about the field of comparative law"). See also
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S.
Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 66 (1998); David Kennedy, New
Approaches to Comparative Law- Comparativism and International Governance,
1997 Utah L. Rev 545, 588 (1997). See also Gunther Frankenberg, Critical
Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 411, 428 (1985)
(referring to comparative functionalism as "the modern paradigm" among the
"dominant paradigms in comparative law"); ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 26, at 34
("The basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality').
But see Michaels, supra note 35, at 339 for the position that the functional method is
a chimera.
36. Hessel E. Yntema, Comparative Legal Research: Some Remarks on
'Looking out of the Cave', 54 MICH. L. REV. 899, 903 (1956).
37. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 26, at 34.
38. Cf Frankenberg, supra note 35, at 438.
39. George P. Fletcher, The Universal and the Particular in Legal Discourse,
1987 BYU L. Rev. 335, 335 (1987) (discussing the views of Otto Kahn-Freund, one of
the leading expositors of the functional method).
40. Curran, supra note 35, at 66 n.76 ("functionalism is suited to yielding results
of similarity because it does not stray from the surface level of functional results to
[Vol. 31:2
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The question of context, by contrast, has not received such an
41
unequivocal answer, for here functionalists face a basic dilemma.
Functionalist approaches cannot specify their all-important functions
at too high a level of abstraction, or in terms that rely to heavily on
"mere rationality." Doing so would carry the twin dangers of
ethnocentric bias in approach42 and of irrelevance and inapplicability
of conclusions. 3 At the same time, functionalists cannot specify
functions "so precisely that every institution performs a complex set
of functions unique to it," 44 as incorporating too much context in this
way would make all comparison impossible.
D. Functionalism and Balancing
For functionalists, references to balancing in judicial opinions
would be the manifestation of a shared underlying function that
judges in different legal orders need to confront. Balancing
references, in this view, are (part of) a solution to a common legal
problem, or set of problems. This perspective immediately provokes
the obvious question: what function, or what problem?
Given that judicial balancing in fundamental rights cases occurs
within the context of constitutional law, it is important to call
attention to the argument that functionalism might be especially well-
suited to constitutional law because it revolves around a smaller and
more homogeneous set of functions than private law. Former
legal problems to societal, historical and cultural underpinnings"). See also Tushnet,
supra note 28, at 1239.
41. Cf ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 26, at 43-44 ("the solutions we find in the
different jurisdictions must be cut loose from their conceptual context and stripped of
their national doctrinal overtones so that they may be seen purely in the light of their
function"), with Riles, supra note 25, at 228 ("With functionalism came a new
attention to 'context,' for if what mattered were the functions of legal rules, it would
be important to understand the meaning of statutes or cases in the context of the
institutional, economic and cultural pillars of each society."), and John Bell,
Comparing Public Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 235, 236
(Andrew Harding & Esin Oruci eds., 2002) ("Generic statements of the functions of
law are of limited value. A comparatist has to examine not only rules and functions,
but also the context in which they operate and in which legal problems arise").
42. Cf Frankenberg, supra note 35, at 415 ("The rigorous rationalist who relies
on conceptual or evolutionary functional universals is prone to give her world-view
and norms, her language and biases only a different label.").
43. Cf Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1238 ("[functionalism] must avoid specifying
functions so generally that its purported insights become banal").
44. Id.
45. Functionalist approaches have tended to focus mostly on private law. C.
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Dutch, European Court of Justice ("ECJ") Judge, Professor
Koopmans, propagates this view in his recent book Courts and
Political Institutions and in his earlier writing on comparative legal
methodology.46 In his view, the comparative study of public law has a
bright side in that "the number of fundamental problems is smaller
than in private law., 47  Detailed analysis of public law in liberal
democracies will, in his view, "unearth a certain number of questions
which are 'fundamental' in the true sense of the word: an answer to
such questions must have been given before the system of public law
could begin to operate.,
48
One important representative example of such a basic function
would be that of the "countermajoritarian dilemma., 49 In discussions
on this dilemma, notions of "balance" - between branches of
government and between individuals and majorities - are in fact often
used. Taking the dilemma to be both a shared, universal problem and
also a sufficient explanation for balancing in individual judicial
opinions, however, is deeply problematic for a number of reasons.
The U.S. constitutional scholar, John Hart Ely has famously
claimed that the countermajoritarian dilemma is both the "central
function" and the "central problem" of judicial review." Others have
echoed this point, arguing for example that the countermajoritarian
problem has "generic flavor,"5 in that when constitutional systems
move toward a model of "checks and balances" a "growth of judicial
power is necessary to provide a balance."52 However tempting it may
be to frame a strong link between observations such as these and the
spread of judicial balancing, such connections are fraught with
Frankenberg, supra note 35, at 437; William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I).-
What Was It Like to Try a Rat 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1987 (1995). See also infra
note 73, and Kennedy, supra note 35.
46. TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE
VIEW (2003).
47. KOOPMANS, supra note 46, at 7.
48. Id. at 8.
49. See Law, supra note 5, at 662-87 passinr, KOOPMANS, supra note 46, para. 5.2
("The counter-majoritarian difficulty"), ch. 8 ("Courts and individual rights").
50. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 4 (1980).
51. Law, supra note 5 at 662. See also Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1234 for the
term 'separation-of-powers functionalism.' See also Mauro Cappelletti, 'The Mighty
Problem' of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 409, 445 (1980) (describing the problem of judicial review as having
become common to Europe and the U.S.).
52. Cappelletti, supra note 51, at 438, (emphasis added).
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difficulty. For one thing, as Mark Tushnet has argued, the claim that
the maintenance of "balance" or "equilibrium" is a fundamental,
shared function has little meaning in the absence of "well-specified
concept of disequilibrium."5  Secondly, recent studies have in fact
emphasized the contingency of understandings of judicial review and
have convincingly argued that "the countermajoritarian dilemma that
obsesses the legal academy is not some timeless problem grounded in
immutable truths."' Thirdly, and most importantly for this article, a
theory of balancing based too heavily on the "countermajoritarian
dilemma" runs into descriptive problems when applied outside the
United States, where summary study shows that "obsession" with this
problem is very much a specifically American phenomenon.5 And
finally, even if it is granted that courts in many jurisdictions do face a
broadly similar problem of having to simultaneously legitimate and
limit their exercise of power, this observation in no way shows the
necessity of adopting balancing specifically as discourse or as method,
let alone as "overarching principle" or "master technique," of
56
constitutional judicial review.
E. Functionalism's Critics: Expressivism
Opposed to functionalism generally, and to its application in the
field of constitutional law in particular, we find a number of different
perspectives that, following Mark Tushnet's classification, may be
53. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1238 n.64 (emphasis added).
54. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 156 (2002). See also
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, MORALITY AND POLITICS IN MODERN EUROPE 6 (1993)
("[E]ven those writers who insist most strongly that they are concerned with the
permanent and unchanging problems of government are in fact concerned with those
problems as they appear in the circumstances of a particular time and place.").
55. There is very little direct discussion, either in legal literature or judicial
opinions, of the dilemma in Europe. In the U.S., on the other hand, the theme is
dominant. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING
THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
56. A wealth of alternative arguments exist, with different varieties being
dominant in different systems. For two often used typologies in the U.S., see PHILIP
C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); Richard
H. Fallon Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
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grouped together under the rubric of "expressivist approaches."57 For
expressivist scholars, functionalism "reduces the law to a formal
technique of conflict resolution, stripping it of its political and moral
underpinnings."58  The opposing vision of law as historically,
politically, economically, culturally and in short: societally contingent,
leads to very different choices with regard to the objects of
comparison, the attention given to context and the emphasis that may
be placed on similarities or differences. The comparative scholar's
task is no longer that of identifying and matching problems and
solutions, but rather of trying to grasp "the local meaning of legal
institutions or practices"" through a process of "cultural
immersion. '"60
In terms of the objects of comparison, the focus shifts decidedly
away from the 'solutions' cherished by functionalists. As Ginter
Frankenberg has put it: "[b]y stressing the production of 'solutions'
through legal regulations the functionalist dismisses as irrelevant or
does not even recognize that law also produces and stocks
interpretive patterns and visions of life."'" Outcomes and solutions
are far less important in these approaches than that what leads up to
these outcomes, the factors conditioning practices, rules and
institutions, and the specific shapes these are given in different
jurisdictions. "Interpretive patterns, 62 "mentait6s, 63 "styles of
thought" and "characteristic patterns of reasoning,"64 are what
matters in comparative law studies in this mode. This shift in
perspective puts legal discourse - language used by judges and other
actors in both the own and the foreign legal order - front and center
as object of comparison, as reflective of an underlying
"jurisprudence," of "visions of law,, 6 and of broader understandings
57. Tushnet, supra note 28.
58. Frankenberg, supra note 35, at 437.
59. Riles, supra note 25, at 241 (emphasis added).
60. Curran, supra note 35, at 51.
61. Frankenberg, supra note 35, at 438.
62. Id.
63. Curran, supra note 35, at 51.
64. Ewald, supra note 45, at 1948. See also Valcke, supra note 23, at 717.
65. Cf PATRICK S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL
THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 4 (1987) ("By a 'vision' we mean, roughly, the
inarticulate and perhaps unconscious belief held to some degree by the public at
large, and more especially by judges and lawyers, as to the nature and functions of
law, and as to how and by whom it should be made, interpreted, applied and
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and perspectives.
While functionalist comparative scholars have limited the
application of their method primarily to private law, their critics have
developed their attacks and alternatives in particular with regard to
public law, and especially, constitutional law. There may be no
"nation-specific forms of civil liability insurance, '  but
Constitutions - in the expressivists' view - undeniably help constitute
national identities and as such are bound to differ from country to
country.67 Public and constitutional law is thought to be especially
contingent on historical, political, and cultural factors. 6 Countering,
the functionalists' stress on similarities of functions; these scholars
emphasize that surely there must be "more than one way to design a
democracy. ' 9 Others are willing to admit that there may be "broadly
generic" functions performed by law in different systems, ° or that
countries are grappling with a set of problems that are "in a general
way similar,"'" but insist that looking for these functions is unlikely to
yield any thorough understanding and carries a serious risk of
misconception.
F Expressivism and Balancing
Expressivist accounts of balancing are likely to focus on
references to balancing as legal arguments, used to achieve a
particular effect with a particular audience, in a particular setting.
The language of balancing will be seen as expressive of underlying
mentalits and patterns of thought that are closely intertwined with
the foundations of the specific legal culture in which they occur. The
goal of expressivist studies of balancing would be to try to
understand, as closely as possible, what balancing references mean to
enforced").
66. Bell, supra note 41, at 247.
67. Cf Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1228 ("Constitutions help constitute the
nation, to varying degrees in different nations, offering to each nation's people a way
of understanding themselves as political beings").
68. Ewald, supra note 45, at 1988 ("I take it to be obvious that the principles of
constitutional law cannot be adequately explained if we limit our attention, as does
the traditional approach, to the study of present-day legal rules. The issues involved
are too closely bound up... with national history").
69. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 832 n.54 (1999).
70. Cf Bell, supra note 41, at 236.
71. Cf Marry Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U.
CH. L. REV. 519, 535 (1992).
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a particular legal community at a given time.
This emphasis on the local, and the important critique that
expressivist understandings have brought to bear on functionalist
approaches, does, however, face a basic problem when it comes to
balancing: how to account for the astounding spread of very similar
looking language, involving references to balancing and
proportionality, in so many legal systems around the world? The
language of balancing - and proportionality - has become a new
lingua franca of courts and constitutional scholars around the world.72
Comparative methodology must be able to account for, or at least
accommodate, this widespread similarity.
Expressivism's difficulty does not end with the increased
commonalities in judicial discourse and the cross-jurisdictional appeal
of balancing-based arguments. As Part III will show, balancing, as
argument, has a number of special qualities that align it particularly
closely with ideas that are presented as having a high degree of
universality, straining to an even greater degree the focus on local
ideas and practices that is so important to expressivist approaches.
III. Transcending the Local
A. Introduction
Quite obviously, careful attention to methodology is important in
all areas of comparative legal studies. The fundamental differences in
outlook between functionalist and other - here: expressivist -
approaches assume a particular significance when it comes to the
study of judicial balancing. More than any other feature of
contemporary legal cultures, judicial balancing fits uneasily in either
dominant outlook. This, it is submitted, is primarily due to two sets of
factors.
First, in terms of comparative law methodology, balancing is
72. See, e.g., Jorg Polakiewicz & Valdrie Jacob-Foltzer, The European Human
Rights Convention in Domestic Law The Impact of the Strasbourg Case-Law in
States Where Direct Effect is Given to the Convention (Parts I, II and III), 12
HUMAN RIGHTS L.J. 65, 66 (1991) ("We are witnessing the beginning of a true
dialogue between the European Human Rights Court and national jurisdictions
whereby principles like the proportionality test that have been developed in certain
national legal orders are taken up by the European Court of Human Rights and later
accepted in other countries as part of a common European standard"); Jackson,
supra note 15, at 803 ("Proportionality analysis is becoming a term of art in
constitutional law").
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uniquely attached to foundational premises and concerns of
functionalist approaches, making the topic especially resistant to
critical insights from opposing perspectives. This attachment comes
in the form of (1) shared historical and conceptual foundations, and
(2) the ways in which balancing practices make continuous explicit
and implicit references to ideas of universality. At the same time, as
(legal) arguments, judicial references to balancing are inherently
dependent on local meanings and understandings for their
legitimizing force. This means that the same balancing language may
signify different mixes of references to the universal and the
particular across cultural settings. In addition, the precise nature of
the links between a court's balancing language and universality differs
as between systems, complicating the picture even further. The
following sections address these various connections in turn.
B. Balancing and the Foundations of the Functional Method
Balancing in judicial reasoning is closely related to the historical
and theoretical foundations of the functional method, the classic,
though criticized, approach to comparative law, as discussed above.
In terms of intellectual history, functionalism as an approach to
comparative law on the one hand, and the very ideas behind judicial
balancing on the other, share the same origins: the German school of
Interessenjurisprudenz and America's proto-realist sociological
jurisprudence in the early decades of the twentieth century. It was
these scholars' understanding of law as dealing with a number of
conflicting private and social interests that forcefully suggested a
depiction of the judge's (and the legislator's) task as involving a
balancing of these interests. That same insight - law as a mechanism
for dealing with conflicting interests - however, also provided the
theoretical underpinnings for functionalism as an approach to
comparative law. By insisting on law as an abstract, "empty"
mechanism of conflict resolution, functionalist comparative scholars
could relegate all contingent elements of context to the realm of
"interests to be regulated."73
73. See, e.g., Otto Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82
L. Q. R. 40, 51 (1966) ("the satisfaction of felt needs of society through the law is, in
my submission, the cardinal subject of all academic legal studies"). Cf Frankenberg,
supra note 35, at 434 n.78 ("only with the rise of Interessenjuisprudenz and
sociological jurisprudence has functionalism become the dominant paradigm of
comparative legal research"). It is difficult to causally attribute the dominance of
functionalism to Interessenjurisprudenz and Sociological Jurisprudence; very little
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Contemporary scholars were quick to realize both the potential
and the limitations of this new understanding of law for comparative
legal scholarship. Phillip Heck, the leading German representative of
the Interessenjurisprudenz, noted how his conception of interests
reduced differences between legal systems and allowed for easier
comparison.74 Pierre Lepaulle, a French lawyer, in a 1922 article on
The Function of Comparative Law, however, was decidedly less
enthusiastic about this 'breakthrough:'
To say that law is a mere balancing of interests involves the
postulate that the legal system is an impartial, impassive receptacle
in which more or less automatic reactions take place. But, as a
matter of fact, we know that the legal machinery of a given society
is very much like a living body with its reactions, its currents, its
temperaments, its prejudices; that it is extra-sensitive to certain
things, blind to others. When reality is presented to the legal eye, it
is as much distorted as it is to the human eye.75
Lepaulle was, of course, not the first to argue that it was
important to see the laws of different societies as reflective of these
same societies. 76  But his argument shows the impetus the new
interest-based conception of law could give to functionalism's,
similarity-oriented approaches to comparative analysis.
It is important to note that the basic connection between the
premise of functionalism in relation to conceptions of balancing itself
is likely to differ between legal systems and cultures. For the German
Interessenjurisprudenz scholars, for example, balancing of interests
was completely neutral and "entirely independent of any ideology. 7
comparative legal research had been carried out before these movements gained
force. The fact that they share the same intellectual origins remains true, though.
See also Kennedy, supra note 35, at 589 n.73.
74. PHILIP HECK, BEGRIFFSBILDUNG UND INTERESSENJURISPRUDENZ 133 (1932).
Michaels, supra note 35, at 349, n.36 quotes Max Rheinstein who described
comparative law as nothing more than a "necessary supplement and continuation of
the jurisprudence of interests."
75. Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 HARV. L. REV. 838,
845 (1922). Lepaulle's Harvard Law Review article seems to have been the very first
treatment of balancing in U.S. comparative law literature. Lepaulle, incidentally,
commented on Roscoe Pound and not directly on Heck or the German writers.
76. Montesquieu famously argued that the laws of each nation should fit the
people for which they were made. See Curran, supra note 35, at 43. See also
ALBERT O. HIRSHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS
FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1997).
77. HECK, supra note 74, at 120, 123 (referring to his method's "juridical
autonomy").
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It is against this background idea of neutrality that claims such as,
that the jurisprudence of interests, "being independent of any
particular Weltanschauung, [could] provide a working basis for the
lawyer under any legal system," must be understood."8 Balancing, in
this view, is intimately related to functionalism because both look at
legal and judicial method as a neutral device that relegates context -
and therefore, difference - to its parameters. For Roscoe Pound and
the Sociological Jurisprudes, on the other hand, balancing of interests
accorded with a vision of law as a form of "social engineering.""
Legal method, under this view, was a purpose-oriented instrument.
At the time Pound expounded this ideology, the effectuation of a
new, "social" conception of justice was, in many Western societies,
the most pressing of these ends.' Once again, under this perspective,
balancing and functionalism come to be intimately related. This time,
however, the relationship is based on the understanding that law's
instrumentality will everywhere be put to the same use, albeit in
different systems."
While the precise nature of the relationship between the
underlying ideas of balancing and functionalism differs between
Europe and the United States, both the neutral and the instrumental
perspectives on balancing share important affinities with the
functionalist approach to comparative law.
C. Balancing and Claims to the Universal (1): Rationality
Unlike alternative legal arguments, such as those drawn from
textualism or interpretations of legislative intent, balancing, in many
of its manifestations, often makes a specific and explicit, dual appeal
to values that are thought to transcend the local and the contingent.
These values are those of (1) rationality and rational decision
making,82 and (2) fairness, as a dominant conception of justice. These
78. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LEGALTHEORY 327 (5th ed. 1967) (1944).
79. Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (Part II), 36 HARV. L. REV.
940, 955 (1923).
80. Cf Roscoe Pound, Social Justice and Legal Justice, 75 CENT. L. J. 455, 458
(1912); Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943).
81. Lepaulle's critique therefore actually shows a better fit with continental ideas
on balancing than with American ones.
82. Cf Adam Seligman and Suzanne Last Stone's observation that "Reason, of
course, as method, is formal and universal in a way that traditions - and texts - are
not, which is the source of its seductive appeal." Adam Seligman & Suzanne Last
Stone, Text, Tradition and Reason in Comparative Perspective.- An Introduction, 28
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two elements are discussed in this and in the following section. Here
too, it will be seen that although the broad contours of these appeals
are similar, their precise content may differ significantly between
legal systems.
Balancing references are often used as shorthand for neutral,
rational decision-making a conception of adjudicating that fits
particularly well with liberal rule of law ideals. A judge who balances,
it is often thought, takes all relevant aspects of a case into
consideration without any predetermined preferences or biases.'
David Beatty's strong defense of the proportionality principle and of
the practice of judicial balancing, for example, is built to a large
extent upon his conception of proportionality and balancing as
rational in this sense. He writes: "[P]roportionality permits disputes
about the limits of legitimate lawmaking to be settled on the basis of
reason and rational argument. It makes it possible to compare and
evaluate interests and ideas, values and facts that are radically
different in a way that is both rational and fair."'  The rationality of
balancing has also been emphasized and defended by others, such as
Frank Easterbrook in the United States (balancing in the cost-benefit
variety) and Robert Alexy in Europe (balancing of fundamental
rights principles).85 It is telling also that one common manifestation of
balancing in the US occurs precisely in the context of what is called
'rational basis' review.
A closer look at these defenses of balancing as rational, however,
shows that 'rationality' is invoked to reflect disparate meanings. In
Europe, one of the most important debates on the rationality of
balancing has taken place between Jurgen Habermas and Robert
Alexy. 6 Robert Alexy, one of the main theorists of balancing on the
Continent, has insisted that "for a showing that balancing is
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 20 (2007).
83. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 55
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (Winter 1992) ("Balancing approaches to decision
openly weigh crucial factors"); Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Balancing.- The Protean
Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 25 (1988) ("Open balancing restrains the
judge and minimizes hidden or improper preference").
84. BEATTY, supra note 11, at 169.
85. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword" The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers trans., 2004) (1985).
86. See HABERMAS, supra note 19; Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing and
Rationality, supra note 19; Alexy, Balancing and Subsumption: A Structural
Compaison, supra note 19; Greer, supra note 19.
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rational ... it is necessary that an inferential system is implicit in
balancing."' The establishment of such an "inferential system," in
turn, "is intrinsically connected with the concept of correctness.
88
Although Alexy does not label his argument as such, it is clear that
his defense proceeds on the basis of a "formal" conception of
rationality, in accordance with Max Weber's famous typology.89 Both
the elements of an "inferential system" and of "correctness," or
"validity," fit neatly with Weber's formal rationality, which may be
defined as "the degree to which the form of the argument yields a
reliable judgment about the truth of its conclusion." 90
In the United States, in contrast, the formal rationality of
balancing as argument does not seem to be an important topic. When
American authors refer to balancing as rational, what they seem to
have in mind is some form of rational decision-making geared
towards achieving results based on "ethical imperatives" and
"utilitarian and other expediential rules."91 Often, these defenses of
balancing talk explicitly of "instrumental rationality," using the law-
and-economics language of cost-benefit analysis.' Balancing, under
this view, becomes an instrument of (utilitarian) judicial policy-
87. Robert Alexy, Discourse Theory and Fundamental Rights, in ARGUING
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 15, 26 (Augustfn Jos6 Mendndez & Erik Oddvar Eriksen
eds., 2006).
88. Id.
89. MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY I (Max
Rheinstein ed., Max Rheinstein & Edward Shils trans., 1954) (1925). For an extended
discussion, see Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal
Rationality, or Max Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode
of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2003).
90. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the
Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 106 HARv. L. REV. 923, 928, 951
(1996). See also WEBER, supra note 89, at 63-64 and Kennedy, supra note 88.
91. Both elements of Weber's definition of "substantive" rationality. See
WEBER, supra note 89, at 63.
92. The debate between Tribe and Easterbrook is conducted in these terms. See
Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency, 94
HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985); Easterbrook, supra note 85. For a sample of discussions
on rationality in American legal literature, see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Limits of
Instrumental Rationality: Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity, 46
S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 618 (1973) (adopting as his definition "that form of rationality
which seeks to discriminate among alternative actions by assessing their comparative
tendency to advance or to retard the achievement of the actor's goals or values" and
referring to Weber's 'purpose rationality'); Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished
Practices, 81 GEO. L. J. 2567, 2624 (1993) (referring to balancing's "instrumental
rationality"). On the relationship between substantive rationality and formal
rationality in Weber's typology, see Kennedy, supra note 88.
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making that is rational in the way that it legitimizes decisions which
promote the achievement of certain overarching objectives or
purposes. 93
D. Balancing and Claims to the Universal (2): Fairness
Balancing's second claim to universality lies in its close
connections to two dominant, contemporary understandings of
justice: (a) proceduralism, and (b) justice as (substantive) fairness.
These two concepts are, again, thought to at least partly transcend
local values and conceptions of justice.
Balancing, firstly, makes direct appeals to the notion of
procedural justice. Its affinity to the ideal of neutrality in decision
making has already been mentioned, but its appeals to proceduralist
conceptions of justice go beyond mere neutrality. Frank Coffin, an
American judge, has described balancing as,
[A] process with demanding standards of specificity, sensitivity and
candor. Open balancing restrains the judge and minimizes hidden
or improper personal preference by revealing every step in the
thought process; it maximizes the possibility of attaining collegial
consensus... and it offers a full account of the decision-making
process for subsequent professional assessment and public
appraisal.94
Other commentators as well, Frank Michelman in the United
States and Robert Alexy in Europe, for example, have called
attention to the close links between balancing as method and basic
tenets of procedural justice.9
The appeal of balancing to ideals of justice is not limited to
aspects of procedure - neutrality, taking all relevant factors into
consideration, reason-giving, etc. - but are also visible with regard to
93. It is important to note that the formal rationality of legal argument is by no
means an excluded topic in American legal literature. This definition has often been
used with regard to other types of legal argument, in particular reasoning by analogy
(for a prominent example see Brewer, supra note 90, who evaluates analogy's
"internal inferential structure" in very similar terms as does Robert Alexy for
balancing in German constitutional law).
94. Coffin, supra note 83, at 25.
95. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986) (arguing that adopting balancing as method commits
courts to "a communicative practice of open intelligible reason-giving"); Alexy, supra
note 87, at 21-23 (drawing attention to the close relationship between balancing and
the "necessity of discursive practices" in constitutional / human rights law).
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its purported outcome: a 'fair balance' between opposing rights,
values and interests. Courts in many different jurisdictions have
elaborated upon what they see as the intimate relationship between
balancing and a conception of justice as fairness. The ECHR, which
rarely refers to balancing without the added qualification "fair," has
held that the search for a fair balance, "to be struck between the
demands of the general interest of the community and the
requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights"
is "inherent in the whole of the Convention" 96 and the U.S. Supreme
Court, for its part, has said that the idea of proportionality is
"essential to the concept of justice." 97 The Supreme Court of Canada,
finally, has made the connections it sees between balancing,
proportionality, rationality, and fairness explicit in its foundational
decision in the case of R. v. Oakes of 1986.'
As with the appeal to rationality, it is important here as well, to
be precise on the nature of the invoked links to fairness. One
significant difference between U.S. and European practices seems to
hinge on the source and the scope of application of 'fairness' in
constitutional adjudication. In U.S. constitutional law terms such as
"fairness" and "proportionality" surface primarily in three, specific
areas of constitutional law: (1) adjudication under the Due Process
Clause; (2) the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Proportionality, in the sense of a fair, or reasonable, relationship
between two parameters, is often referred to specifically as "Eighth
Amendment proportionality," 99 while the phrase "fundamental
fairness" is used virtually exclusively with regard to the Due Process
96. Sporrong & L6nnroth v. Sweden, App. No. 7151/75, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
A), at par. 69.
97. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
98. R. v. Oakes, supra note 5, at para. 70 ("Although the nature of the
proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances, in each case courts will be
required to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups. There
are, in my view, three important components of a proportionality test. First, the
measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They
must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations')(emphasis added).
99. See Solem v. Helm, 436 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) ("When the Framers of the
Eighth Amendment adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights, they also
adopted the English principle of proportionality"). Among many examples in legal
literature, see Joshua R. Pater, Struck out Looking: Continued Confusion in Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Review After Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179
(2003), 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399 (2003).
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clause.&°° In both instances, the relevant notions of fairness are
derived from specific constitutional guarantees that are applicable
only to a relatively narrow range of cases.1°' Fairness, as a general
principle of constitutional law is an idea that is largely alien to U.S.
constitutional theory and practice.'02
In much of European law, on the other hand, fairness and
proportionality are accorded the status of "general principles,"
applicable to all cases involving fundamental rights, and with a
radiating effect throughout the legal order. 3 Appeals to fairness and
proportionality, in the context of judicial balancing in Europe, must
be read against this comprehensive background. This setting imbues
such invocations with a very specific meaning, not found in the U.S.
context.
E. Conclusion
Part III has argued two points. First, although balancing is, at its
100. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (describing "fundamental
fairness" as the relevant test under the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments). See also Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960);
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411 (1993).
101. One favorite reference is the Magna Carta's prohibition on excessive
punishment. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, supra note 99.
102. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1024 (1978) (balancing as "an overarching principle of
constitutional construction has never been Supreme Court doctrine" in the United
States"). For a dissenting view - cited so often as to almost prove this point - see
generally Larry Catd Backer, Fairness as a General Principle of American
Constitutional Law. Applying Extra-Constitutional Principles to Constitutional Cases
in Hendricks and ML.B., 33 TULSA L.J. 135 (1997). Catd Backer admits, though,
that a "constitutional principle of fairness" is among the "least acknowledged"
principles in American constitutional law. Id at 137.
103. The literature on general principles in European law - and in particular on
proportionality - is vast. On proportionality, see for example the contributions to
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE (Evelyn Ellis ed.,
1999). See also TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW (2nd ed.
2007). On proportionality and the ECHR, see generally StBASTIEN VAN
DROOGHENBROECK, LA PROPORTIONALITt DANS LE DROIT DE LA CONVENTION
EUROPtENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (2001). For a discussion in English of
proportionality as a general principle in German law, see DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 46 (2nd
ed. 1997). Cati Backer, supra note 102, at 137, acknowledges the difference with
regard to the European Court of Justice ("the ECJ has made its crafting of general
principles of Community law an explicit part of its jurisprudence; the American
Supreme Court continues to hide its similar enterprise behind an increasingly ill-
fitting, black-letter constitutional jurisprudence").
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most basic, a legal argument that is necessarily embedded in local
understandings, it is special in the sense that, as an argument it makes
a strong, dual appeal to values and ideas that transcend the local.
Secondly, in each case, the nature of these links and of the ideas
invoked differ significantly. The universality of balancing has been
framed in terms of substantive neutrality (the German
Interessenjurisprudenz scholars) and instrumentality towards
universal goals (Sociological Jurisprudence in the United States).
Defenses of balancing in terms of rationality turn out to rest on very
different definitions - formal and substantive. And when it comes to
fairness and reasonableness, there are important differences in the
extent to which legal systems see these values as overarching
principles, or as localized doctrinal categories. All these differences
mean that the proportion between the global and the local - or the
universal and the particular 1' - in balancing discourse will, itself, be
highly context-specific.
IV. Balancing and the Categories of Legal Thought
A. Introduction
Judicial balancing - in the many ways it figures explicitly in
judicial reasoning - habitually transcends familiar categories of legal
thought. The difficulty of locating balancing in conventional,
analytical schemes becomes acute in comparative law because of the
general need for abstractions applicable across different legal orders.
Part IV discusses two of the most common and important boundary-
crossing scenarios: the "technical" boundaries between legal doctrines
and, what may be called, the boundary between the legal and the non-
legal.
B. Categories and Qualifications
Judicial references to "balancing" and "weighing" will often be
reflective of constructs operating within different technical categories
of legal thought. As was discussed previously, balancing may locally
be seen, for example, as (part of) an overarching principle, or as an
element of a doctrinal "test" applicable only within the confines of a
specific area of law, such as freedom of expression or the law of
104. Cf Fletcher, supra note 39, at 335 (commenting on the "universal" and the
"particular" in legal discourse).
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procedural guarantees (due process).05 The terms used for these
classifications, such as "doctrine" and "principle," in addition,
evidently do not carry precisely the same meaning everywhere."
The absence of uniformity in descriptions of what balancing is -
already problematic with regard to traditional legal categories -
becomes even more troublesome for comparative studies when
commentators leave traditional definitions and begin to write about
balancing in terms of "ages," "master techniques" and "foundational
conceptions." By way of illustration, consider the descriptions of the
role of balancing in the United States and Germany by Alexander
Aleinikoff (1987) and Walter Leisner (1997), respectively."
Aleinikoff's famous article on U.S. constitutional law in the Age
of Balancing, contains very little discussion of what the qualification
"age" is meant to signify. The author writes simply of the "hold that
balancing has on our approach to constitutional cases. ' 8 We know
we have entered the "age of balancing" when "[b]efore we have time
to wonder whether we ought to balance, we are already assessing the
relative weights of the interests."' 9 Walter Leisner, in his evocatively
entitled book The Balancing State (Der Abwagungsstaat), writes that
judicial balancing has spread to such proportions in German
constitutional law that "the Constitution, ultimately, could dissolve
into [balancing based] proportionality" ("daB die Verfassung sich
letztlich in VerhaltnismaBigkeit auflOsen knnte")." °
There are obvious broad similarities between these two powerful
images of "age of" and "dissolution into ..... " For one, it seems clear
that each commentator is trying to assert a very specific point: that in
the system under investigation balancing has developed into
something more than the aggregate of a large number of individual
references in judicial opinions."' This suggests that the quality of
105. See supra, Section 111.4.
106. Compare Cati Backer, supra note 102, at 140 (the definitions of doctrines as
"general propositions" and principles as "rules of conduct"), with Emerson H. Tiller
& Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 517 (2006)
(definition of doctrine as "precedent" used in the US), and Philippe Jestaz &
Christophe Jamin, The entity of French doctrine: Some thoughts on the community
of French legal writers, 18 LEGAL STUDIES 415 (1998) (definition of doctrine as "legal
writing" used in France).
107. Aleinikoff, supra note 8, at 965; LEISNER, supra note 6.
108. Aleinikoff, supra note 8, at 971.
109. Id at 971-72.
110. LEISNER, supra note 6, at 20.
111. See, e.g., STONE SWEET, supra note 7 (balancing as master technique of
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"something more" is apparently, in very similar ways, an issue of
interest in each system. Each of these descriptions, however, invokes
a conceptual apparatus that is not commonly used in comparative
study. Comparing the nature of this added dimension, therefore, is
especially complicated because of the absence of shared terminology
and understandings. Put briefly, if we want to know how
"overarching principle of construction" relates to "foundational
conception of the State," we find very little guidance in standard
constructs of comparative method, whether they focus on functions to
be fulfilled or arguments used, on solutions produced or mentalitds
and styles of thought. In the absence of such a conceptual apparatus
for comparison, and given the obvious and widespread similarity in
balancing language, there is a real danger that those observing from
the outside will tend to overemphasize evident similarities at the cost
of neglecting subtle, but important, differences.
C. Legal and Non-legal, Form, and Substance
There is a second way in which balancing references transgress
familiar legal categories in a way that is problematic for comparative
law methodology. Balancing references are special in that, as
arguments, they may have both predominantly "legal' and more
"non-legal' meanings. As writers such as Duncan Kennedy and
Mitchel Lasser have pointed out, judicial discourse, in the modern,
post-realist mode of legal thought that is prevalent in the West,
generally contains a mix of formal (in the sense of deductive) and
substantive (policy-oriented) elements."2 Examples of the first
category are appeals to precedent or deduction from textual sources;
examples of the second type of argument are references to the
purpose of constitutional provisions (teleological reasoning) or equity
arguments. The way these elements are combined and the relative
importance of each element in each legal system differ in ways that
may, to a large extent, be seen as emblematic for each system."3
Very often, however, balancing-based arguments occupy a
judicial governance); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, 'Abwagung'- ein neues Rechtsparadigma?,
69 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE (A.R.S.P.) 463 (1983) (balancing
as paradigm of law).
112. See LASSER, supra note 23; Kennedy, supra note 89, at 1071 ("In the
contemporary mode of legal thought, legal interpretation is based on a combination
of deductive argument.., and what is called 'policy argument"').
113. For this argument, see LASSER, supra note 23.
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special place in this basic division. Balancing and proportionality
tests can, in different contexts, be seen as either predominantly
substantive, extra-legal arguments that have been formalized to an
unusual extent, or as unusually substance-dependent forms of
(formal) legal argument."' Balancing arguments, in most settings, are
relatively open forms of reasoning, incorporating such contextual
elements as "interests," "circumstances" or "factors" to be weighed.
The significance of this "openness," however, will vary among
different legal systems and cultures. A judge using the language of
balancing may be signaling that she is engaged in "extra"'- "non-
legal" practical reasoning, weighing costs and benefits the way an
ordinary rational decision maker might. References to balancing, in
this sense, can be seen as acknowledgments of the limitations of 'law'
in dealing with difficult cases.
Alternatively, by actually saying that they are balancing -
something that their audience may suspect judges will be doing
anyway - courts may be signaling their desire to channel general
practical reason through specifically legal or formal constraints.
Many courts, for example, make elaborate attempts to show that their
balancing in judicial opinions is different from ordinary, "all things
considered" practical reasoning. The U.S. Supreme Court has
formulated a wide variety of different 'balancing tests' that it presents
as heavily structured forms of reasoning to be applied - as the "law" -
in subsequent cases."5 And in Europe, the ECHR often structures its
judgments under various headings that systematically address
different parts of its balancing inquiry.
16
Debates on the faults and merits of balancing often follow the
114. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 89, at 1073 (on the "typification or
ritualization" of legal policy argument). See also LASSER, supra note 23, at 64 passim
(on the formal nature of American "multi-part" (balancing) tests).
115. Cf LASSER, supra note 23, at 78 passim. One particularly prominent
manifestation of the formalization of reasoning in the US is the scheme of "tiered
scrutiny." This specific form of classifying cases for the purposes of constitutional
analysis has been argued to offer a "formal faqade" and a "somewhat artificial air of
precision" to value judgments. See Calvin R. Massey, The NewFormalism: Requiem
for Tiered Scrutiny, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 980-81 (2004).
116. For one example among many, see Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom,
App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 6 (1979). The dogmatic literature
on balancing and proportionality in Germany is vast. See for some examples among
many Karl Larenz, Methodische Aspekte der 'Gifterabwgung', in FESTSCHRIFT
KLINGMOLLER (von Schmidt & Hauss eds., 1974); BERNHARD SCHLINK, ABWAGUNG
IM VERFASSUNGSRECHT (1976).
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form/substance division sketched out here. Thus, we see balancing
practices being criticized both as overly rigid and formal,117 and as too
heavily substantive and political.' What is important for the
purposes of this article, is not the substance of these defenses and
critiques, but rather the point that a methodology for the comparative
analysis of judicial balancing must be able to encompass both
perspectives. A reference to balancing may, depending on the
setting, be either an explicit abandonment of the ideals of legal
formality, or an explicit effort to stretch legal formality as far as it can
go. 9 Furthermore, in both cases, what judges try to signal may be
either very controversial or accepted practice; the distinction is
another dimension that comparative research should be able to
include.
These observations have two primary consequences for the
comparative study of judicial balancing. First, it is important that
analysis of balancing capture the two dimensions of form and
substance, and bring into focus differences in the relative
contributions from each element in different legal systems and
cultures. Because of the unique way in which balancing arguments
fuse formal and substantive elements, doing so in practice is likely to
be more complicated than in the study of alternative legal arguments.
Second, the greater the predominance of formal elements in
balancing, the more bound up balancing references will be with
posited law and doctrine, and vice-versa. This correlation has a direct
117. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing.- A Theory of
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 651 (1994) ("The [Supreme]
Court has employed balancing with a formalistic certainty that perverts the elegance
of the method"); Coffin, supra note 83, at 39 (wondering whether modern tendencies
in balancing do not represent "a return to the oracular or formal style" of judicial
reasoning).
118. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989); Richard H. Pildes, A voiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62 (1992) (showing how
advocates of both balancing and rule-based approaches try to distinguish their legal
enterprise from "politics," but do so in different ways).
119. One important factor in this respect is obviously the extent to which textual
sources require or mandate balancing. A similar debate can be observed in the
United States with regard to reasoning by analogy. Compare Charles Fried, The
Artificial Reason of the Law Or. What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35, 57-58
(1981) (describing reasoning by analogy as "a civilized attempt to stretch reason as
far as it will go," with Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 86
(1996) (describing reasoning by analogy as a "phantasm").
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impact on the question of "scope" of comparison, or the relative
importance of context, identified at the beginning of this article,
because the more formalized balancing becomes, the more relevant
context will be to its understanding.12
D. Conclusion
References to balancing will often have to be located within
different categories of legal thought. Part IV has relied on the
examples of doctrinal categories and labels and of the form/substance
divide to show how these ambiguities, or dualities, complicate
comparative analysis. Just as with the explicit appeals of balancing to
universal values - discussed in Part III - the ambiguities analyzed
here too exert an important push towards emphasizing similarity.
Awareness of these complications should provide a welcome
clarification to the understanding of claims for universal qualities in
balancing practices.
V. Conclusion: Balancing the Global and the Local
Comparative law scholarship is continuously faced with the
dilemmas involved in trying to identify the global and the local, the
universal, and the particular, in law and legal culture. This article has
argued, that the comparative study of judicial balancing is to an even
greater extent subject to these dilemmas because of a series of basic
ambiguities and dualities inherent in the language of balancing.
When it comes to balancing, much would seem to favor the
perspective of the universal. Factors such as closeness to the
conceptual foundations of functionalist modes of comparative law;
intuitive connections to ideals of rationality, reasonableness and of
procedural and substantive fairness that are thought to transcend the
local; and -most importantly - the sheer volume and scope of very
similar-sounding references to balancing found all over the world,
would seem to strongly push in this direction.
This article has tried to show, however, that each of these links to
universality creates its own complexities, as the ties between
balancing and "functionalism," "rationality" or "fairness" are
understood very differently in different legal systems and cultures.
120. Cf Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV.
220, 235 (2005) ("the less a legal approach is positivistic and context-specific the more
it circulates").
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The "push towards the universal" that these connections exert, must,
therefore, be qualified to a significant extent.
This article has also highlighted a second dimension to the
problematic quality of balancing as a topic in comparative law; the
fact that balancing references frequently transcend familiar categories
of legal thought. Intriguingly, it may well be that many of these basic
ambiguities are the very foundation of the overwhelming
contemporary appeal of balancing - an issue that lies beyond the
scope of this article.12' What is clear, however, is that in terms of
comparative law methodology, these ambiguities create significant
problems for finding common terms of reference.
As balancing more and more often comes to be seen as
emblematic for entire legal cultures, determining what Annelise Riles
has called its "local meaning" will become ever more important."' Of
course, such a local meaning may be partially built around shared
needs, understandings, histories and contexts, but it has, first and
foremost, a specific local significance. 3  Looking for the local
meaning of the argument of balancing in constitutional legal
discourse leaves open all the possibilities that this article identified as
relevant; balancing references may code for both a mix of different
ideas expressed in very similar ways and similar ideas expressed in
slightly - but potentially significantly - different ways.
Perspectives on balancing that focus too heavily on the universal,
such as David Beatty's view of proportionality as a "universal rule of
law," have already come under fire for not telling "the whole story"
about different systems. These critiques, however, have so far
emphasized elements such as the fact that balancing and
proportionality will often "co-exist with attention to historically
specific aspects of national constitutions" or that "the way in which
balancing is done will differ depending on a society's history and
121. Two elements of circumstantial support for this claim may be adduced here -
first, Thomas Grey's description of "legal pragmatism," a line of thought potentially
very closely connected to balancing: "Pragmatists see law as both policy and
principle, both wealth maximization and interpretation, both detached scientific tool
sharpening and engaged cultural immersion." Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal
Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 26 (1996). Second, Peter Westen's argument
that the enduring appeal of "equality" has to be found in this concept's substantive
"emptiness." See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1982).
122. Riles, supra note 25, at 241.
123. This could be a local meaning against the background of a "globalization of
legal thought." Cf Kennedy, supra note 9.
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expectations concerning the relative importance not only of
individual rights and social interests, but also of the role of courts and
legislatures. 1 24 By underscoring the suggestion that the very idea of
balancing itself has different meanings in different legal systems and
cultures, this preliminary study should contribute to the development
of a richer, fuller perspective on the legitimizing force of a type of
argument on which much of modern judicial practice in the field of
fundamental rights has come to rest.
124. Jackson, supra note 15, at 810; Donald Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill v.
Colorado and Free Speech Balancing in the United States and Canada, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 187, 189 (2001) (my emphasis, JB).
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